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Abstract. Moving target defense (MTD) is a proactive defense approach that
aims to thwart attacks by continuously changing the attack surface of a system
(e.g., changing host or network configurations), thereby increasing the adver-
sary’s uncertainty and attack cost. To maximize the impact of MTD, a defender
must strategically choose when and what changes to make, taking into account
both the characteristics of its system as well as the adversary’s observed activities.
Finding an optimal strategy for MTD presents a significant challenge, especially
when facing a resourceful and determined adversary who may respond to the
defender’s actions. In this paper, we propose a multi-agent partially-observable
Markov Decision Process model of MTD and formulate a two-player general-
sum game between the adversary and the defender. Based on an established model
of adaptive MTD, we propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework
based on the double oracle algorithm to solve the game. In the experiments, we
show the effectiveness of our framework in finding optimal policies.
1 Introduction
Traditional approaches for security focus on preventing intrusions (e.g, hardening sys-
tems to decrease the occurrence and impact of vulnerabilities) or on detecting and re-
sponding to intrusions (e.g., restoring the configuration of compromised servers).While
these passive and reactive approaches are useful, they cannot provide perfect security in
practice. Further, these approaches let adversaries perform reconnaissance and planning
unhindered, giving them a significant advantage in information and initiative. As adver-
saries are becoming more sophisticated and resourceful, it is imperative for defenders
to augment traditional approaches with more proactive ones, which can give defenders
the upper hand.
Moving Target Defence (MTD) is a proactive approach that changes the rules of
the game in favor of the defenders. MTD techniques enable defenders to thwart cyber-
attacks by continuously and randomly changing the configuration of their assets (i.e.,
networks, hosts, etc.). These changes increase the uncertainty and complexity of attacks,
making them computationally expensive for the adversary [32] or putting the adversary
in an infinite loop of exploration [28].
Currently, system administrators typically have to manually select MTD config-
urations to be deployed on their networked systems based on their previous experi-
ences [10]. This has two main limitations. First, it can be very time consuming since
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there are constraints on data locations, physical connectivity of servers cannot be eas-
ily changed, and resources are limited. Second, it is difficult to capture the trade-off
between security and efficiency [5].
In light of this, it is crucial to provide automated approaches for deploying MTDs,
which maximize security benefits for the protected assets. This requires a design model
that reflects multiple aspects of the MTD environment [15,32,23,2]. Further, we need
a decision making algorithm for the model to select which technique to deploy and
where to deploy it [28]. Finding optimal strategies for deployment of MTDs are com-
putationally challenging. For example, the adversary can adapt to MTD deployments,
or the state-action space of the environment can be huge even for trivial number of
MTD configurations or in-control assets.
Recently, many research efforts have applied Independent Reinforcement Learn-
ing (InRL) techniques to find the best action policies in known or unknown decision
making environments, such as cybersecurity. In InRL, an agent learns to make the best
decision by continuously interacting with its unknown environment. In general, tra-
ditional reinforcement learning techniques use tabular approaches to store estimated
rewards (e.g., Q-Learning) [11]. To address challenges of reinforcement learning such
as exploding state-action space, Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) have replaced table
based approaches in many domains, thereby decreasing the training time and memory
requirements. This led to the emergence of deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algo-
rithms such as DQL [20].
The naive approach to multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is to use InRL
where one player treats the opponent’s action as part of its localized environment [6].
However, two problems arise here: 1) convergence guarantees are lost since these lo-
calize environments are non-stationary and non-Markovian [13]; and 2) These policies
can not generalize well since they overfit to the opponent’s policies [12].
Contributions We create a multi-agent partially-observable Markov decision process
for MTD, and based on this model we propose a two-player general-sum game between
the adversary and the defender. We present a multi-agent deep reinforcement learning
approach to solve the game. Our main contributions are as follows:
– We propose a multi-agent partially-observable Markov decision process for MTD.
– We propose a two-player general-sum game between the adversary and the de-
fender based on this model.
– We formulate the problem of finding adaptive MTD policies as finding the mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium of this game.
– We propose a compactmemory representation for the defender and adversary agents,
which helps them to better operate in the partially observable environment.
– We propose a computational approach for finding the optimal MTD policy using
Deep Q-Learning and the Double Oracle algorithms.
– We evaluate our approach while exploring various game parameters.
– We show that our approach is viable in terms of computational cost.
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
a multi-agent partially-observable Markov decision process for MTD which is used as
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the basis of the MARL. In Section 3, we describe the preliminaries such as the InRL
(Section 3.1), and one of InRL family algorithms, ie., Deep Q Learning (Section 3.2).
In Section 4, we formulate a two-player general-sum game between the adversary and
the defender, and formulate the problem of finding adaptiveMTD policies as finding the
MSNE of the game. In Section 5, we discuss the solution overview (Section 5.1), discuss
the challenges faced when solving the game (Section 5.2), and propose our framework
to solve this game (Section 5.3). In Section 6, we provide a thorough numerical analysis
of our approach. In Section 7, we discuss the related work. Finally, in Section 8, we
provide concluding remarks and outline of directions for future work.
2 Model
Tomodel adaptiveMoving Target Defense, we build aMulti-Agent Partially-Observable
Markov Decision Process (MAPOMDP) based on the model of Prakash and Well-
man [23]. In this adversarial model, there are two players, a defender and an adversary,
who compete for control over a set of servers. At the beginning of the game, all servers
are under the control of the defender. To take control of a server, the adversary can
launch a “probe” against the server at any time, which either compromises the server
or increases the success probability of subsequent probes. To keep the servers safe, the
defender can “reimage” a server at any time, which takes the server offline for some
time, but cancels the adversary’s progress and control. The goal of the defender is to
keep servers uncompromised (i.e., under the defender’s control) and available (i.e., on-
line). The goal of the adversary is to compromise the servers or make them unavailable.
For a list of symbols used in this paper, see Table 1.
2.1 Environment and Players
There areM servers and two players, a defender and an adversary. The servers are in-
dependent of each other in the sense that they are independently attacked, defended, and
controlled. The game environment is explained in detail in the following subsections.
2.2 State
Time is discrete, and in a given time step τ , the state of each server i is defined by tuple
sτi = 〈ρ, χ, υ〉 where
– ρ ∈ Z∗ represents the number of probes lunched against server i since the last
reimage,
– χ ∈ {adv, def} represents the player controlling the server, and
– υ ∈ {up} ∪ Z∗ represents if the server is online (i.e., up) or if it is offline (i.e.,
down) with the time step in which the server was reimaged.
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Table 1: List of Symbols and Experimental Values
Symbol Description Baseline Value
Environment, Agents, Actions
M number of servers 10
∆ number of time steps for which a server is unavailable after reimaging 7
ν probability of the defender not observing a probe 0
α knowledge gain of each probe 0.05
CA attack (probe) cost 0.20
θ
p
sl slope of reward function 5
θ
p
th steep point threshold of reward function 0.2
wp weighting of reward for having servers up and in control of adversary /
defender
0 / 1
rpτ reward of player p in time step τ
Heuristic Strategies
PD period for defender’s periodic strategies 4
PA period for adversary’s periodic strategies 1
π threshold of number of probes on a server for PCP defender 7
τ threshold for adversary’s / defender’s Control-Threshold strategy 0.5 / 0.8
Reinforcement Learning
T length of the game (number of time steps) 1000
γ temporal discount factor 0.99
ǫp exploration fraction 0.2
ǫf final exploration value 0.02
αt learning rate 0.0005
|E| experience replay buffer size 5000
|X| training batch size 32
Ne number of training episodes 500
2.3 Actions
In each time step, a player may take either a single action or no action at all. The
adversary’s action is to select a server and probe it. Probing a server takes control of it
with probability
1− e−α·(ρ+1) (1)
where ρ is the number of previous probes and α is a constant that determines how fast
the probability of compromise grows with each additional probe, which captures how
much information (or progress) the adversary gains from each probe. Also, by probing
a server, the adversary can understand whether it is up or down.
The defender’s action is to select a server and reimage it. Reimaging a server takes
the server offline for a fixed number∆ of time steps, after which the server goes online
under the control of the defender and with the adversary’s progress (i.e., number of
previous probes ρ) against that server erased (i.e., reset to zero).
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2.4 Rewards
Prakash andWellman [23] define a family of utility functions. The exact utility function
can be chosen by setting the values of preference parameters, which specify the goal of
each player. The value of player p’s utility function up, as described by Equation 2 and
Equation 3, depends on the number of servers in control of player p and the number
of servers offline. Note that the exact relation depends on the scenario (e.g., whether
the primary goal is confidentiality or integrity), but in general, a higher number of in
control servers yields a higher utility.
up(npc , nd) = w
p · f
(
npc
M
, θp
)
+ (1− wp) · f
(
npc + nd
M
, θp
)
(2)
where npc is the number of servers which are up and in control of player p, nd is the
number of unavailable (down) servers, and f is a sigmoid function with parameters θ:
f(x, θ) =
1
e−θsl·(x−θth)
(3)
where θsl and θth control the slope and position of the sigmoid’s steep point, respec-
tively.
Table 2: Utility Environments
Utility Environment wa wd
0 control / availability 1 1
1 control / confidentiality 1 0
2 disrupt / availability 0 1
3 disrupt / confidentiality 0 0
Reward weight (wp) specifies the goal of
each player. As described by Prakash and Well-
man [23], there can be four extreme combinations
of this parameter, which are summarized in Ta-
ble 2. For example, in control / availability, both
players gain reward by having the servers up and
in control. Or in disrupt / availability, which is the
most interesting case, the defender gains reward
by having the servers up and in control, while
the adversary gains reward by bringing down the
servers or having them in control.
The defender’s cost of action is implicitly defined by the utility function. In other
words, cost of reimaging a server comes from not getting reward for the times that it is
“down.” However, the adversary’s reward accounts for the cost of probing (CA), which
is a fixed costs that can be avoided by not taking any action.
The reward given to the adversary (raτ ) and defender (r
d
τ ) at time τ is defined by:
raτ =
{
ua(nac , nd)− CA adversary probed a server at τ
ua(nac , nd) adversary did nothing
(4)
rdτ = u
d
τ (5)
2.5 Observations
A key aspect of the model is the players’ uncertainty regarding their state. The de-
fender does not know which servers have been compromised by the adversary. Also,
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the defender observes each probe with a fixed probability 1 − ν (with probability ν,
the probe is undetected). Consequently, the defender can only estimate the number of
probes against a server and whether a server is compromised. However, the defender
knows the the status of all servers (i.e., whether the server is up or down, or if it is
down, how many time steps it requires to be back up again).
The adversary always observes when the defender reimages a compromised server,
but cannot observe reimaging an uncompromised server without probing it. Conse-
quently, the adversary knows with certainty which servers are compromised.
Observation of a player p at time τ is defined as a vector of tuples O
p
i where O
p
i
corresponds to observation of p of server i.
Opτ = 〈O
p
1,τ , O
p
2,τ , · · · , O
p
M,τ 〉 (6)
The adversary knows which servers are compromised and knows how many attacks
it has initiated on each server. Also, if the server is down, the adversary can estimate
the time that the server is up again. The observation of a server i for adversary at time
τ is defined as a tuple Oai,τ :
∀0≤i<M : O
a
i,τ = 〈status, time to up, progress, control〉 (7)
where status ∈ {1, 0} which shows the server is up or down, and control ∈ {1, 0}
shows that the adversary controls that server or not, respectively.
Observation vector of the defender is almost the same as the adversary. The only
difference is that the defender does not know who controls the servers, and only has a
estimation on the number of probes (where ν is not 0):
∀0≤i<M : O
d
i,τ = 〈status, time to up, progress〉 (8)
To overcome challenges regarding the defender which are described in Section 5.2,
we included two more attributes to have some form of memory for the defender. These
two attributes are described in Section 5.2.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe the family of reinforcement learning algorithms (Section 3.1),
and one algorithm in this family, namely the Deep Q-Learning (Section 3.2).
3.1 Independent Reinforcement Learning
One of the main approaches for finding a decision making policy is the Independent
Reinforcement Learning (InRL) which focuses on interactions of a single agent and the
environment, in order to maximize the agent’s gain (presented as rewards or utilities)
from the environment. Figure 1 shows the interactions between different components
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of InRL. Further, the InRL algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. A basic InRL envi-
ronment is a Partially-Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), which can be
represented as a tuple:
POMDP = 〈S,A,T, R,O〉. (9)
where S is the set of all possible states in the environment (described in Section 2.2),
A is the set of all possible actions by the agent, T is the set of stochastic transition
rules (Section 2.2 and Section 2.3), R is the immediate reward of a state transition
(Section 2.4), and O is the set of observation rules of the agent (Section 2.5).
Agent
Environment
A
ct
io
n
N
ew
st
at
e U
tility
Fig. 1: Independent reinforcement
learning.
The training is done in iterations called
epochs. During each epoch, the training algorithm
performs two operations on the environment: (1)
resetting the environment to the starting state. In
return, the environment provides the agent with
the initial observation; (2) for each step, the agent
decides on an action to take which updates the
state of the environment based on transition rules.
Each epoch of training is finished and the en-
vironment is forced to reset when the number
of steps taken in current epoch reaches T . It is
possible to complete the training without having
epochs, however, this condition ensures that 1) the
majority of the action/observation space is explored, 2) the training agent is not stuck
in a locally optimal state.
Each step to the environment updates the state of the system based on the agent’s
action (a) and the current state of the environment (s), and returns a new observation
(O), immediate utility given to agent (r), and whether the environment is finished or not.
This new information and the previous observation of the agent forms an experience.
Specifically, an experience is defined as a tuple of:
e = 〈Oτ , aτ , Oτ+1, rτ 〉 (10)
where Oτ and aτ are the agent’s observation and action at time step τ ; and Oτ+1 and
rτ are the agent’s observation and immediate utility received at the next time step τ +1.
The objective of InRL is to find one policy π which is a mapping from observation
space to action space, such that:
π(Oτ ) 7→ a (11)
which maximizes U∗τ = E
[
∞∑
t=0
γtrt+τ
∣∣∣∣∣π
]
(12)
where γ ∈ [0, 1), the “discount factor,” prioritizes the rewards claimed at the current
time step over the future rewards. When γ = 0, the player only cares about the current
rewards, and when γ = 1, the player cares about all future rewards equally.
Reinforcement learning aims to maximize the received utility of the agent (U∗) by
trial and error: interacting with the environment (randomly, heuristics, or referring to the
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experiences the agent has seen so far), generally, during the training, there are two ways
to find actions to be taken at each step: (1) Exploitation: we use the currently trained
policy to choose actions, which helps the agent to more accurately find U∗ values of
actions in a state. (2) Exploration: to find optimal actions which yields to higher utility
by doing random action and exploring the Action/Observation space. One of approaches
for deciding on doing exploration or exploitation is the ǫ-greedy where in each step the
agent explores with probability ǫ, or take the current optimal action with probability
1− ǫ.
Algorithm 1: InRL
Result: policy σ
Q← random;
for Ne episodes do
O ← reset game();
ǫτ ← 1;
for τ ∈ {0, . . . , Tepoch} do
if random[0, 1] ≤ ǫτ then
a← random action;
else
a← argmaxa′ Q(S, a
′);
end
(S′, r) ← step game(a);
add e = 〈S, S′, a, r〉 to E;
sampleX from E;
update DQN based onX ;
S ← S′;
decay ǫτ ;
end
end
σ ← 〈S 7→ argmaxaQ(S, a)〉;
Algorithm 2: Adaptive Solver
Result: set of pure policiesΠa andΠd
Πa ← attacker heuristics;
Πd ← defener heuristics;
while Up(σp, σp¯) not converged do
σa, σd ← solve MSNE(Πa, Πd);
θ ← random;
πa+ ← train(T ·Ne, env
a[σd], θ);
Πa ← Πa ∪ πa+;
assess πa+;
σa, σd ← solve MSNE(Πa, Πd);
θ ← random;
πd+ ← train(T ·Ne, env
d[σa], θ);
Πd ← Πd ∪ πd+;
assess πd+;
end
3.2 Deep-Q-Network Learning
Q-Learning uses aQ function to estimate the expected future utilities of an action in an
observation state (Equation 12):
Q(Oτ , aτ ) = U
∗
τ (13)
Given a tabular approach of storing the Q value for each observation state, we can find
the value of the Q function by applying the Bellman optimization equation:
Q(Oτ , aτ ) = (1 − α) ·Q(Oτ , aτ ) (14)
+α · (rτ + γ ·max
a′
Q(Oτ+1, a
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
TD Target
)
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where α is the learning rate of the Q function. The idea for updating the Q function is
that the Q function should minimize the temporal difference (TD) error, ie., the differ-
ence between the predictedQ value, and the actual expected utility (U∗).
Mnih et al. [20] show that it is possible to use multi layer perceptrons (MLP) as
approximators for the Q function. This is useful since neural networks can generalize
the similarities between the observation states andQ values. When using the MLP asQ
approximator with parameters θ, we define a mean squared error (MSE) loss function
on a batchX of experiences:
Lθ =
1
|X |
X∑
i
(qτ −Q(Oτ , aτ |θ))
2 (15)
where qτ is the TD Target of Equation 14 and the optimal action is argmaxa′ Q(Oτ , a
′):
qτ = rτ + γQ(Oτ+1, argmaxa′ Q(Oτ , a
′))|θ) (16)
We can minimize the loss (Lθ) with gradient descent and learning rate α.
4 Problem Formulation
In Section 2, we build an MTD model using a MAPOMDP. In this section, based on
this model, we design an adversarial game between the adversary (denoted by p = 1
or a) and the defender (denoted by p = 0 or d). In this setting, we assume that each
player chooses a strategy to play, where each strategy is a policy function that given the
current observation of the environment, returns an action to be taken. As we assumed
that each playing strategy is a policy function, in this paper, we use the terms “strategy”
and “policy” interchangeably.
4.1 Pure Strategy
A pure strategy πp for player p is a deterministic policy function πp(Op) 7→ ap which
given player p’s current observation of the system (Op) produces an action ap to be
taken by this player. We denote the set of pure strategy space for player p in this adver-
sarial game as Πp.
When players are following pure policies πa ∈ Πa and πd ∈ Πd, their expected
utility can be expressed as sum of discounted future rewards with discount factor of γ.
Formally:
∀p∈{1,0} : U
p(πp, πp¯) = E
[
∞∑
t=0
γt · rpt
∣∣∣∣∣πp, πp¯
]
(17)
4.2 Mixed Strategy
One way to express stochastic policies is to use probability distributions over pure poli-
cies. A mixed strategy of player p is a probability distribution σp = {σp(πp)}pip∈Πp
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over the player’s pure strategies Πp where σp(πp) is the probability that player p,
chooses policy πp.
We denote Σp as the strategy space of player p. The utility profile of the adversary
and the defender when they are following mixed strategies σa ∈ Σa and σd ∈ Σd,
respectively, can be calculated as:
∀p∈{1,0} : U
p(σp, σp¯) =
∑
pip∈Πp
∑
pip¯∈Πp¯
σp(πp) · σp¯(πp¯) · Up(πp, πp¯) (18)
Note that the notation of utility profile of players when they follow pure strategies
is overloaded to also support the use of mixed strategies.
4.3 Solution Concept
The aim of both players is to maximize their utility. As we are considering a strong
adversary and defender, we can assume that they always pick the strategy which max-
imizes their own utility. A “best response” mixed strategy σ
p
∗(σ
p¯) ensures maximum
utility for the player choosing it (p) while the opponent is using mixed strategy σp¯. In
other words, the agent choosing a best response mixed strategy σ
p
∗ cannot gain more
utility without having the opponent changing its strategy. When the player p is using a
mixed strategy σP , the opponent’s best response is:
σp∗(σ
p¯) = argmaxσp U
p(σp, σp¯) (19)
We optimize one player’s strategy assuming that the opponent always uses a best
response strategy to the player’s strategy, σp = σp∗(σ
p¯). This formulation of a general-
sum game is in fact equivalent to finding a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) of
players’ policy space Πa and Πd. In other words, a combination of strategies (σp∗ , σ
p¯
∗)
is MSNE, iff :
∀p∈{1,0}∀σp∈Σp : U
p(σp∗ , σ
p¯
∗) ≥ U
a(σp, σp¯∗) (20)
That is, neither agent can increase its expected utility without having the opponent
changing its strategy. Therefore, our solution must find the MSNE of the MTD game
whereΠa andΠd are the policy space of the players.
5 Framework
In Section 2, we described a moving target defense model as a Multi-Agent Partially-
Observable Markov Decision Process (MAPOMDP). In Section 4, we proposed a game
based on this model and concluded that finding an optimal action policy for the adver-
sary and the defender is equivalent to finding the MSNE of the game. In this section,
we propose a computational approach and build a framework atop of the double oracle
(Section 5.1) and DQL (Section 3.2) algorithms to find the optimal action policies for
the adversary and the defender.
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5.1 Solution Overview
The iterative Double Oracle (DO) algorithm[19], solves the MSNE of a game given an
arbitrary subset of policy space for each player (Π
p
0 ⊂ Π
p). We denote the explored
policy space of player p until iteration τ of the DO algorithm by Πpτ . In each iteration
τ of the DO algorithm, for each player, a pure strategy best response (π∗) to the MSNE
of the opponent is calculated using a “best response oracle” and added to the strategy
sets. Formally, in each iteration:
∀p∈{1,0} : Π
p
τ+1 ← Π
p
τ ∪ {π
p
∗(σ
p¯
∗,τ )} (21)
where σ
p
∗,τ is the MSNE of the player p given the strategy sets Π
p
τ . The DO algorithm
guarantees [19] the convergence of the MSNE of these strategy sets to the actual MSNE
of the game as long as the policy space for both players are finite. However, as the policy
space of the players are huge (still finite), enumeration of the policy space in search of
the best response is infeasible.
For each player, we can use a tabular based InRL such asQ-Learning[30] algorithm
as a best response oracle to find a best response pure strategy to the opponent’s MSNE.
Since the opponent’s strategy is fixed, the agent learning through reinforcement learning
can treat the opponent’s actions as part of its localized environment without overfitting
to the opponent’s policies.
5.2 Challenges
Solving the MAPOMDP model of Section 2 with the DO algorithm is not straight-
forward. In the following subsections, we discuss the issues faced while solving the
MAPOMDP model and propose approaches for resolving these issues.
Partial Observability For both players, state is only partially observable. This can
pose a significant challenge for the defender, who does not even know whether a server
is compromised or not. Consider, for example, the defender observing that a particular
server has been probed only a few times: this may mean that the server is safe since it
has not been probed enough times; but it may also mean that the adversary is not probing
it because the server is already compromised. We can try to address this limitation by
allowing the defender’s policy to consider a long history of preceding states; however,
this poses computational challenges since the size of the effective state space for the
policy explodes.
Since partial observability poses a challenge for the defender, we let the defender’s
policy use information from preceding states. To avoid state-space explosion, we feed
this information into the policy in a compact form. In particular, we extend the observed
state of each server (i.e., number of observed probes and whether the server is online)
with (a) the amount of time since the last reimaging and (b) the amount of time since
the last observed probe. So, the actual state presentation of the defender will be:
Odi = 〈status, time to up, progress,
time since last probe,
time since last reimage〉 (22)
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Similarly, the adversary should probe the servers which where probed in many steps
in the past to make sure that its progress was not reset. So, we add the amount of time
since the last probe to its observation state.
Oai = 〈status, time to up, progress, control,
time since last probe〉 (23)
Complexity of MSNE Computation In zero-sum games, computation of MSNE can
be done using linear programming which has a polynomial time complexity. However,
in general-sum games, the solving algorithms is PPAD-complete[27] which makes it
infeasible for solving a game of non-trivial size. Therefore, we use an “ǫ-equilibrium”
solver, which produces an approximate correct result. One such solver is the Global
Newton solver[7].
Equilibrium Selection Typically, the DO algorithm is used with zero-sum games
which all the equilibria of the game yield the same payoff for each player. However,
in general-sum games, there may exist multiple equilibria with significantly different
payoffs. The DO algorithm in general-sum games only converges to one of these equi-
libria. The exact equilibrium the DO algorithm converges to depends on the initial pol-
icy space of the players and the exact output of the best response oracle. However, in our
experiments (Section 6.3), we show that in practice, in adversarial games, this problem
is not significant, ie., all equilibria produce almost the same results (Table 4) indeferent
to the initial policy space.
Model Complexity Due to the complexity of our MAPOMDP model, computation
of best response using tabular InRL approaches is computationally infeasible. In fact,
even representation of a single policy as keeping the best action for all the observation
states is infeasible. Further, tabular approaches fail to generalize the relations between
observations and actions. Thus, the action/observation space need to be enumerated
many times in order for the algorithm to produce correct results.
To address this challenge, we can use computationally feasible “approximate best
responses” to produce an approximate best response pure strategy(π+) instead of true
best responses. Lanctot et al. [12] show that deep reinforcement learning can be used
as an approximate best response oracle. However, when approximate best responses are
used instead of true best responses, convergence guarantees are lost. In our experiments,
we show that this algorithm indeed converges with six iterations (see Figure 2b).
Short-term Losses vs. Long-term Rewards For both players, taking an action has a
negative short-term impact: for the defender, reimaging a server results in lower rewards
while the server is offline; for the adversary, probing incurs a cost. While these actions
can have positive long-term impact, benefits may not be experienced until much later:
for the defender, a reimaged server remains offline for a long period of time; for the
attacker, many probes may be needed until a server is finally compromised.
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As a result, with typical temporal discount factors (e.g., γ = 0.9), it may be an op-
timal policy for a player to never take any action since the short-term negative impact
outweighs the long-term benefit. In light of this, we can use higher temporal discount
factors (e.g., γ = 0.99). However, such values can pose challenges for deep reinforce-
ment learning since it will be much more difficult to converge.
5.3 Solution Approach
Prakash and Wellman [23] proposed a set of heuristic strategies for each player (de-
scribed in Section 6.1). However, as these strategies are only a subset of the agents’
policy spaces, their MSNE is not necessarily the MSNE of the Σa and Σd. In Sec-
tion 5.1, we show how we can find the MSNE of the game, given a subset of policy
space for each agent. In this section, we propose our framework to find the MSNE of
the MTD game and therefore, the optimal decision making policy for the adversary and
the defender. Algorithm 2 shows a pseudo-code of our framework.
We start by initializing the adversary’s and defender’s strategy sets with heuristic
policies (Section 6.1). From this stage, we proceed in iterations. In each iteration, first,
we compute MSNE of the game restricted to the current strategy sets Πa and Πd,
and take the adversary’s equilibrium mixed strategy σa and train an approximate best-
response policy (πd+(σ
a)) for the defender assuming that the adversary uses σa. Next,
we add this new policy to the set of policies of the defender (Πd ← Πd ∪ {πd+}).
Then, we do the same for the adversary. First, find the MSNE strategy of the de-
fender (σd), and train an approximate best-response policy (πa+(σ
d)) for the adversary
assuming that the defender uses σd. Then, we add this new policy to set of policies for
the adversary (Πa ← Πa ∪ {πa+}).
In both cases, when computing an approximate best response (π+(σ∗)) for a player
against its opponent’sMSNE strategy σ∗, the opponent’s strategy σ∗ is fixed, so we may
consider it to be part of the player’s environment. As a result, we can cast the problem of
finding an approximate best response for agent as Independent Reinforcement Learning
(InRL). Each iteration of InRL, defined as train() in Algorithm 2, receives a total
number of steps T of training, and initial parameters θ. Moreover, we denote the InRL
environment for the player p when the opponent plays with a mixed strategy σp¯ as
envp[σp¯].
As we are dealing with discrete action/observation spaces in the MTD model, DQL
[20] is a suitable InRL algorithm for finding an approximate best response. In each
time step of the InRL, both players need to decide on an action. The learning agent
either chooses an action randomly (ie., exploration), or follows its current policy. The
opponent whose strategy is fixed to a mixed strategy σp¯ refers to a pure strategy πp¯ ∈
Π p¯i with probability distribution σp¯, and follows that policy.
The MSNE payoff evolves over these iterations whenever we add a new policy for
an agent, which is trained against the best mixed strategy of the opponent, the MSNE
changes in favor of the agent. We continue these iterations until the MSNE payoff of
the defender and the adversary (Up(σp∗ , σ
p¯
∗)) converges. Formally, we say that the for
both players the MSNE is converged iff :
∀p∈{1,0} : U
p(πp+, σ
p¯) ≤ Up(σp, σp¯) (24)
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where (σp) is the previous MSNE and πp+ is the approximate best response found for
player p in opposing to the opponent’sMSNE at the current iteration. This convergence
means that neither the adversary nor defender could perform better by introducing new
policies.
6 Evaluation
In this section, first we describe the heuristic strategies of the MTD game (Section 6.1).
Next, we describe our implementation of the framework (Section 6.2). Finally, we dis-
cuss the numerical results (Section 6.3).
6.1 Baseline Heuristic Strategies
Prakash and Wellman [23] proposed a set of heuristic strategies for both the adversary
and the defender. Earlier, we used these strategies as our initial policy space for the DO
algorithm. In this section, we describe these heuristics.
Adversary’s Heuristic Strategies
– Uniform-Uncompromised: Adversary launches a probe every PA time steps, al-
ways selecting the target server uniformly at random from the servers under the
defender’s control.
– MaxProbe-Uncompromised: Adversary launches a probe every PA time steps, al-
ways targeting the server under the defender’s control that has been probed the most
since the last reimage (breaking ties uniformly at random).
– Control-Threshold:Adversary launches a probe if the adversary controls less than a
threshold τ fraction of the servers, always targeting the server under the defender’s
control that has been probed the most since the last reimage (breaking ties uni-
formly at random).
– No-Op: Adversary never launches a probe.
Defender’s Heuristic Strategies
– Uniform:Defender reimages a server everyPD time steps, always selecting a server
that is up uniformly at random.
– MaxProbe: Defender reimages a server every PD time steps, always selecting the
server that has been probed the most (as observed by the defender) since the last
reimage (breaking ties uniformly at random).
– Probe-Count-or-Period (PCP): Defender reimages a server which has not been
probed in the last P time steps or has been probed more than π times (selecting
uniformly at random if there are multiple such servers).
– Control-Threshold: Defender assumes that all of the observed probes on a server
except the last one were unsuccessful. Then, it calculates the probability of a server
being compromised by the last probe as 1 − e−α·(ρ+1). Finally, if the expected
number of servers in its control is below τ ·M and it has not reimaged any servers in
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PD , then it reimages the server with the highest probability of being compromised
(breaking ties uniformly at random). In other words, it reimages a server iff
E[ndc ] ≤M · τ (25)
and the last reimage was at least PD time steps ago.
– No-Op: Defender never reimages any servers.
Table 3 shows the expected rewards for all combinations of heuristic defender and
adversary strategies in an environmentwhose parameters are described in Table 1. Also,
in this table, we compare our mixed strategy policies computed by DQL to these strate-
gies.
Table 3: Payoff Table for Heuristic Adversary vs. Defender. For comparison, MSNE
strategy payoffs are shown.
Adversary
Defender
No-OP ControlThreshold PCP Uniform MaxProbe Mixed Strategy DQL
No-OP
26.89
98.20
26.89
98.20
26.89
98.20
46.03
95.83
26.89
98.20
33.23
97.47
MaxProbe
78.66
47.69
75.67
49.62
36.58
93.01
64.56
67.12
41.99
86.82
45.87
87.84
Uniform
79.08
46.74
70.97
51.58
44.43
89.48
56.83
76.23
57.14
75.21
45.91
88.16
ControlThreshold
63.64
85.98
65.58
85.35
46.38
88.81
59.54
81.32
60.43
80.09
45.91
87.91
Mixed Strategy DQL
62.78
72.29
58.31
82.45
45.76
91.32
55.31
87.10
44.57
91.32
45.23
92.38
6.2 Implementation
We implemented theMAPOMDP of Section 2 as an Open AI Gym [4] environment.We
used Stable-Baselines’ DQN[9] as the implementation of the DQL. Stable-Baselines
internally uses TensorFlow [1] as the neural network framework. For the artificial neu-
ral network as our Q approximator, we used a feed forward network with two hidden
layers of size 32, and tanh as our activation function. The rest of parameters are avail-
able at Table 1. We implemented the remainder of our framework in Python, including
the double oracle algorithm. For computation of the mixed strategy ǫ-equilibrium of a
general-sum game, we used the Gambit-Project’s Global Newton implementation [18].
We run the experiments on a computer cluster where each node has two 14 Cores 2.4
GHz Intel Xeon CPU and two NVIDIA P100 GPU. Each node is capable of running
≈ 75 steps of DQL per second, which yields to 1.5 hours per each reference to the
best response oracle (ie., DQL training for an adversary or a defender). Further, the
DQL algorithm is not distributed, so we only use one core of the CPU. This paves the
way for multiple DQLs to run at the same time. We also need to mention that, set of
policies only needs to be pre-computed. While policies are in use, inference takes only
milliseconds.
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6.3 Numerical Results
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Fig. 2: In Figure 2b, iteration 0 shows the MSNE payoff of the heuristics while each
DQN training for adversary and defender happens at odd and even iterations, respec-
tively.
Figure 2a shows the learning curve of the agents for their first iteration of the DO
algorithm (Iteration 1 and 2), with the MTD environment whose parameters are spec-
ified in Table 1. We can see the improvement of the resulted policy compared to the
heuristics (Table 3).
Figure 2b shows the evolution of MSNE payoff over the iterations of the DO al-
gorithm with environment parameters of Table 1. In this figure, each training for the
adversary and defender happens at odd and even iterations, respectively, while iteration
0, is the payoff equilibrium of heuristic policies. Also, this figure shows that the DO
algorithm indeed converges with ≈ 4 trainings for each player, ie., 6 hours of training
in total. Comparing multiple runs with the same configuration (highlighted runs in Ta-
ble 4), shows that the DO algorithm with multiple approximations (eg., approximation
with deep networks, approximation on equilibrium computation).
The converged equilibrium payoffs for the adversary and the defender for different
environment parameters are shown in Table 4. These payoffs are in fact in agreement
with empirical game theoretic analysis EGTA done by Prakash and Wellman [23].
To analyse the impact of equilibrium selection on the MSNE payoff of the game, we
executed Algorithm 2 with the same environment parameters of gray rows of Table 4,
but without heuristics as initial policies. The initial policies are set to NoOP adversary
and NoOP defender. As we can see in Table 4, the payoffs for the adversary and de-
fender are almost identical in both cases (using heuristics as initial policy space and
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7 Related Work
Table 4: Final Equilibrium Payoff
of MTD environment with differ-
ent configurations
M utenv θ
p
th CA ∆ α ν Adversary Defender
Heuristics as Initial Policy Space
10 2 0.2 0.2 7 0.05 0 46.46 88.69
10 2 0.2 0.2 7 0.05 0 49.13 87.27
10 2 0.2 0.05 7 0.05 0 63.26 86.31
10 2 0.2 0.1 7 0.05 0 57.83 87.21
10 2 0.2 0.05 7 0.05 0 63.03 87.37
10 2 0.2 0.1 7 0.05 0 58.08 86.55
10 2 0.2 0.2 7 0.05 0 46.58 88.60
10 0 0.2 0.05 7 0.05 0 35.05 92.07
10 0 0.5 0.05 7 0.05 0 8.98 77.27
10 0 0.8 0.05 7 0.05 0 1.80 73.10
10 0 0.2 0.1 7 0.05 0 30.87 90.81
10 0 0.5 0.1 7 0.05 0 7.59 92.41
10 0 0.8 0.1 7 0.05 0 1.80 73.10
10 0 0.2 0.2 7 0.05 0 26.89 98.20
10 0 0.2 0.1 3 0.05 0 30.64 94.46
10 1 0.2 0.1 7 0.05 0 26.89 98.20
10 1 0.2 0.05 7 0.05 0 26.89 98.20
10 1 0.2 0.2 7 0.05 0 26.89 98.20
10 1 0.2 0.1 3 0.05 0 26.89 98.20
10 3 0.2 0.1 7 0.05 0 74.16 97.83
10 3 0.2 0.05 7 0.05 0 79.31 97.90
10 3 0.2 0.2 7 0.05 0 65.21 97.66
NoOP as Initial Policy Space
10 2 0.2 0.2 7 0.05 0 50.72 90.23
10 2 0.2 0.2 7 0.05 0 46.34 89.83
10 2 0.2 0.2 7 0.05 0 47.68 88.92
In this work, we used multi agent reinforcement
learning to find optimal policies for the adver-
sary and the defender in an MTD game model.
In prior work, researchers have investigated both
the application of reinforcement learning in cyber-
security (Section 7.2) and game-theoretic mod-
els for MTD (Section 7.1). Perhaps the most
closely related work on integration of reinforce-
ment learning and moving target defense is the
work done by Sengupta and Kambhampati[24].
They propose a Bayesian Stackelberg gamemodel
to MTD and solve (ie., finding the optimal ac-
tion policy for the defender) it using Q-Learning.
However, their approach is not applicable in our
model since 1) Our model is not a Stackleberg
game; neither the adversary nor the defender ob-
serves the actions taken by the opponent, and 2)
Their proposed model has less complexity, mak-
ing table based Q-Learning feasible.
7.1 Moving Target Defense
One of the main research areas in moving target
defense is to model interactions between the ad-
versaries and the defenders. In the area of game-
theoretic models for moving target defense, the
most closely related work is from Prakash et
al. [23], which introduces the model that our work
uses. This model can also be used for defense
against DDoS attacks[31], and defense for web
applications[25]. Further, in this area, researchers have proposed MTD game models
based on Stackelberg games[15], MarkovGames[14,28], MarkovDecision Process[32],
and FlipIt game [22].
For solving a game model (ie., finding the optimal playing strategies), numerous ap-
proaches such as solving a min-max problem [15], non-linear programming [14], Bell-
man equation [28,32], Bayesian belief networks[2], and reinforcement learning[6,10,22]
has been suggested.
7.2 Reinforcement Learning for Cyber Security
Usage of machine learning and especially deep reinforcement learning (DRL) for cyber
security has gained attention recently. Nguyen et al. [21] surveyed current literature on
applications of DRL on cyber security. These applications include: DRL-based security
methods for cyber-physical systems, autonomous intrusion detection techniques, and
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multi-agent DRL-based game theory simulations for defense strategies against cyber
attacks.
For example, Malialis [16,17] applied multi-agent deep reinforcement learning on
network routers to throttle the processing rate in order to prevent distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attacks. Bhosale et al. [3] proposed a cooperativemulti-agent reinforce-
ment learning for intelligent systems [8] to enable quick responses. Another example
for multi-agent reinforcement learning is the fuzzy Q-Learning approach for detect-
ing and preventing intrusions in wireless sensor networks (WSN) by Shamshirband et
al. [26]. Furthermore, Tong et al. [29] proposed a multi-agent reinforcement learning
framework for alert correlation based on double oracles.
Iannucci et al. [11] use deep reinforcement learning to find the optimal policy in
intrusion response systems. They evaluate the performance of their algorithm based on
different configurations of the model, showing that it can be much faster than traditional
Q-learning.
8 Conclusion
Moving target defense tries to increase adversary’s uncertainty and attack cost by dy-
namically changing host and network configurations. In this paper, we have proposed
a multi-agent reinforcement learning approach for finding MTD strategies based on an
adaptive MTD model. For improvement of the performance of agents in partially ob-
servable environments, we proposed a compact memory presentation for the agents.
Further, we show that the double oracle algorithm with DQL as best-response oracle is
a feasible and promising solution for finding the optimal actions in general-sum adver-
sarial games as it is stable.
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